


Dr. Pranshu Bajpai July 14th, 2021

NCCoE, NIST Workshop on Preventing and Recovering from Ransomware and Other Destructive Cyber Events

Agenda


- Ransomware Threat Comprehension
- Ransomware Response Playbooks
- Industry-wide
 Collaborative Efforts



RANSOMWARE THREAT COMPREHENSION

Redefining Ransomware

A type of malware that attempts financial extortion by gaining leverage over the victim's computing resources



Financially motivated


Politically / ideologically motivated

Overall Threat Landscape - Public Sector

- Public sectors systems under increased threat
- Diversity and refinement in attack vectors
- General *responsiveness* of ransomware actors
- Targeted and manual ransomware attacks gaining traction
- Increasing ransom demands indicate successful business model


Example scenario

- Organization hit with a ransomware
 - Attack vector: Compromised credentials
 - Impact: Multiple systems
 - Demand: \$100,000 \$(MILLIONS)






Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) versus The Victim



RANSOMWARE RESPONSE PLAYBOOKS

Ransomware Incident Response (FAQs)

- When does ransomware response begin?
 - Planning versus execution
- How regularly should the response playbook be updated?
 - Establishing update cadence
- How should the playbook be communicated?
 - Ensuring communication and comprehension
- When should response be escalated?
 - Establishing escalation criteria
- How to resolve ambiguity in the response playbooks?
 - Defining terms, teams, stakeholders, system tiers
- How to ensure proper containment?
 - Establishing timely containment procedures
- How to maintain an updated list of internal and external resources?
 - Enumerating response resources



Effective Ransomware Response Playbooks

- 1 KNOW YOUR ENVIRONMENTS Hardware, Software, Applications, Data Flows
- 2 KNOW YOUR ADVERSARY Who is attacking and how might they do it?
- 3 OUTLINE TEAMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Who is accountable / responsible for what?
- 4 OUTLINE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS Who should be involved?
- 5 UNDERSTAND, TEST, IMPROVE, REPEAT Well-understood, Well-practiced response activities
- 6 ORDER OF OPERATIONS Priorities and timelines

Challenges

Strategic

- Creating a consistent criteria for assessing the true impact, scope, severity
- Tapping into the relevant threat intelligence feeds to update response strategy
- Comprehending the true cost of a ransomware incident

Tactical

- Determining the appropriate internal and external stakeholders to be involved
- Assigning responsibilities while minimizing gaps and overlaps in response efforts
- Working with the affected teams to understand the architecture and technology stack



Standardized Threat Mapping (MITRE ATT&CK)

Lateral Exfiltration Initial Access Defense Evasion Collection Credential Movement Access 39 techniques 9 techniques 9 techniques 15 techniques 9 techniques 17 techniques Abuse Elevation Drive-by Brute Force (4) **Exploitation of** Archive Automated Control Mechanism (4) Compromise Remote Collected Exfiltration (1) Credentials Services Data (3) Access Token **Exploit Public**from Manipulation (5) Data Facing Password Internal **Audio Capture** Transfer Size Application Stores (5) Spearphishing BITS Jobs Limits Automated External Exploitation Build Image on Host Lateral Tool Collection Exfiltration Remote for Credential Transfer Services Deobfuscate/Decode Over Access Clipboard Data Files or Information Alternative Remote Hardware Forced Protocol (3) Service Data from **Deploy Container** Additions Authentication Session Cloud Storage Exfiltration Hijacking (2) Direct Volume Access Object Phishing (3) Forge Web Over C2 Credentials (2) **Domain Policy** Remote Channel Data from Replication Modification (2) Services (6) Configuration Through Input Exfiltration Repository (2) Removable Capture (4) Execution Replication Over Other Media Guardrails (1) Through Network Man-in-the-Data from Removable Medium (1) Supply Chain Middle (2) Information Media Compromise (3) Repositories (2)


Rapid Standardized Communication

Pre-incident analysis

- Identify your specific security technology stack
- Identify gaps in security coverage
- Address gaps and reassess periodically

Post-incident assessment

- Identify gaps that led to the ransomware incident
- Identify additional security controls required to address these gaps
- Share lessons learned with the community



https://cyberdefensematrix.com/

Conclusion

- Post-breach assumption: strategize next steps
 - Zero-trust architectures
 - Response strategies
 - Business continuity and disaster recovery (beyond just backups)
- Know thy enemy:
 - RaaS, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), motives
 - Develop internal and/or external threat intelligence channels
- Know thyself:
 - Technology stacks, mission-critical environments
 - Gaps in security controls, visibility, detection methodologies
- Industry-wide collaboration:
 - Timely information-sharing via trusted partners



